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The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Towards Establishing an Effective 
Regional Contentious Jurisdiction 
"No human problem transcends national boundaries to the degree that 
violations of human rights do, not only in terms of the causes, but also 
in the search for solutions. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Court) handed down its first verdict in the Velasquez Rodriguez 
case.2 The Velasquez Rodriguez case concerned the disappearance 
of Honduran student Angel Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez.3 
The Court found that the Honduran government had violated 
the American Convention on Human Rights (American Conven-
tion)4 by failing to "respect and ensure" the student's right to 
personal liberty, humane treatment, and life.5 
The Velasquez Rodriguez case was only the second case heard 
under the Court's contentious jurisdiction.6 The Inter-American 
1 M. CRAHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASIC NEEDS IN THE AMERICAS ix (1982). 
2 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary ob-
jections), July 29,1988 (merits); see Facts on File, Aug. 5,1988, § A3, at 577; N.Y. Times, 
July 30, 1988, at I, col. 2. 
S The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., July 29, 1988 (merits), at paras. 
2-3. 
4 American Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter American Convention], reprinted 
in INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PER-
TAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEAlSer. UV/II.65, doc. 6, 
at 27 (1985) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
5 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., July 29, 1988 (merits), at para. 
194. 
6 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) decided its first contentious case 
in 1981. In re Viviana Gallardo [hereinafter the Gallardo case], INTER-AM. CT.H.R., July 
22, 1981, No. G 101181, reprinted in 4 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 
booklet 25, at 1 (T. Buergenthal & R. Norris eds. 1982) [hereinafter SYSTEM]. The Court 
decided its second contentious case in 1988. The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. 
CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary objections), July 29, 1988 (merits). This Comment 
focuses on the factors which may have contributed to the seven year gap in contentious 
cases. The Inter-American Court has both advisory and contentious jurisdictions. Unlike 
its advisory jurisdiction, the Court's contentious jurisdiction allows the Court to decide 
127 
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Commission on Human Rights (Commission) referred this case 
to the Court's contentious jurisdiction in April 1986 along with 
the Francisco Fairen GarbilYolanda Solis and Saul Godinez Cruz cases 
which also concern disappearances in Honduras. 7 It is unclear, 
however, whether the Court's 1988 and future 1989 judgments 
signal the commencement of a new trend in the protection of 
human rights in the American region.s The disuse of the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction prior to 1988 may indicate deficiencies 
within the Inter-American system which counteract the Court's 
recent progress for human rights in the Velasquez Rodriguez case.9 
This Comment examines the small number of cases decided 
under the Court's contentious jurisdiction and assesses the 
Court's future role in the protection of human rights. The Com-
ment first provides an historical exegesis on the Court's conten-
tious jurisdiction and outlines the procedures applied to conten-
tious cases.1O Second, the Comment analyzes and proposes 
suggestions for resolving the general problems plaguing the 
Court's establishment as a vital human rights organ. I I Third, the 
Comment addresses the specific problems within the American 
Convention which inhibit the Court's contentious jurisdiction 
from fulfilling its intended role. The Comment analyzes the 
Court's progress towards invigorating this jurisdiction and pro-
poses amendments to the American Convention. 12 Finally, the 
Comment evaluates the manner in which the Court's limited 
enforcement capability discourages utilization of its contentious 
jurisdiction. 13 
II. THE CREATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT'S 
CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION 
The establishment of the Court's contentious jurisdiction was 
an important achievement in the recognition of human rights in 
cases which are adversarial in nature and to determine whether a human rights violation 
has occurred. See infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text. 
7 Kokott, Pending Proceedings, 7 HUM. RTS. L.]. 423, 423-29 (1986). 
8 Note, First Contentious Cases Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 3 AM. U.]. 
INT'L L. & POL'y 283, 296 (1988); see Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection 
of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 439, 487 (T. Meron ed. 1985). 
9 See supra note 6. 
IO See infra II. 
II See infra IlIA. 
12 See infra III B. 
I3 See infra III B(5). 
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the American region. 14 Rampant human rights violations in the 
American region triggered widespread concern that domestic 
governments had failed to legally guarantee basic human rights. 15 
This concern incited the drafting of the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration) and the 
American Convention l6 within the framework of the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) between the years 1948 and 
1978,17 By creating the Court's contentious jurisdiction, the 
American Convention offered hope for the legal protection of 
human rights in the American region. IS 
The American Declaration represents the American states' first 
attempt to delineate those human rights which require the utmost 
I4 M. QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 161 (1988); Buergenthal, TheInter-
American Court, Human Rights and the OAS, 7 HUM. RTS. L.J. 157, 161 (1986); Cabranes, 
Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1147 
(1967). 
15 Buergenthal, The American Convention on Human Rights: Illusions and Hopes, 21 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 121, 123-24 (1971); see M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 16-17; Thomas & Thomas, 
Human Rights and the Organization of American States, 12 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 319, 321, 
323,351 (1972). 
16 American Convention, supra note 4; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man (American Declaration), adopted 1948, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 17. 
Member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) adhere to the American 
Declaration while those member states which have ratified the American Convention on 
Human Rights (American Convention) are referred to as states parties. Cerna, The Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 311, 312-13 (1987). 
17 The OAS is a regional agency formed by the United Nations. HANDBOOK, supra note 
4, at 3. One of the United Nation's purposes is to "achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, 
and ... [to] promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or re1igion[.]" U.N. CHARTER, 
reprinted in P. SIEGHART, THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND, art. 1(3), app. at 170-71 
(1985). The OAS Charter was signed at the Ninth International Conference of American 
States in 1948. OAS CHARTER, opened for signature Apr. 30,1948,2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 
No. 2361, reprinted in 1 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 2, at iii. The OAS Charter and its 
Protocol have been ratified by the following states: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, EI Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. Id., booklet 2.2, at 3. This Comment refers to these states as "American states" 
or "member states" depending on the context. These states are located in the "American 
region." The OAS Charter is the constitution of the OAS. Id., booklet 2, at iii. In the 
OAS Charter's preamble, the American states were "[c]onfident that the true significance 
of American solidarity and good neighborliness [could] ... only mean the consolidation 
on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individ-
ualliberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man[.]" Id. at 1. 
18 Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 161, 164. 
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governmental respect. 19 The American states adopted the Amer-
ican Declaration at the Ninth International Conference of Amer-
ican States in 1948.20 The American Declaration includes a com-
prehensive list of human rights and their corresponding 
obligations,21 but its nonbinding nature does not ensure protec-
tion of these rights.22 
A. The Inter-American Commission's Role Under the Ameri,can 
Convention 
The member states created the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (Commission) to assist domestic legal recognition 
of those human rights listed within the American Declaration.23 
The Commission emerged from this background with a rather 
undefined role and took recourse in broadly interpreting its stat-
ute.24 Prior to the creation of the Court, the Commission pursued 
the promotion and protection of human rights in the American 
region.25 Yet, the nature of the nonbinding American Declaration 
weakened the authority behind the Commission's initial efforts.26 
As a result, the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Hu-
19 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 5. 
2°ld. at 19. 
21 Id. The preamble of the American Declaration states, "The affirmation of essential 
human rights by the American States together with the guarantees given by the internal 
regimes of the states establish the initial system of protection considered by the American 
States as being suited to the present social and juridical conditions ... [.J" Id. 
22 The Fifth Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Santiago, 
Chile 1959) created an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission). 
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 8-9; M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 37-38. 
23 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 8-9. The Commission's jurisdiction extends to all OAS 
member states under the American Declaration. Buergenthal, Human Rights in the Amer-
icas: View From the Inter-American Court, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 303, 306 (1987). 
24 Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1167-68, 1173. The Commission engaged in an "ad hoc" 
protection of human rights. Id.; see Espiell, The Organization of American States (OAS), in 2 
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 543, 553 (K. Vasak ed. 1982). 
25 Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 828, 833 (1975). Without the benefit of a binding convention, there was an "aura 
of make-believe attached to the inter-American human rights system, denying it the 
political authority that flows from constitutional legitimacy." Id.; Buergenthal, Human 
Rights in the Americas: View from the Inter-American Court, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 303, 306-07 
(1987). Article 51(e) of the OAS Charter lists the Commission as an organ of the OAS. 
OAS CHARTER, supra note 17, at art. 51(e). Under article 112 of the OAS Charter, the 
Commission's purpose is to promote and protect human rights. Id. at art. 112. See id. at 
art. 150. 
26 Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 828, 833 (1975). 
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man Rights adopted the American Convention on Human Rights 
on November 22, 1969.27 Besides including many of the human 
rights within the American Declaration, this binding instrument 
clarified and legitimized the Commission's promotional role.28 
The American Convention outlines the Commission's purpose 
and role. Under the American Convention, the Commission's 
purpose is to "promote respect for and defense of human 
rights. "29 Accordingly, the American Convention allocates specific 
powers to the Commission. First, the Commission may receive 
petitions alleging violations of the American Convention by any 
state party from any person, group, or legally recognized non-
governmental entity.30 The Commission's jurisdiction for inter-
state disputes, however, is limited to those states which have rec-
ognized its competence.31 An individual, group, or 
nongovernmental entity may petition the Commission on their 
own behalf or on behalf of another person.32 The individual's 
direct access to the Commission is one of the Commission's great-
27 American Convention, supra note 4. The American Convention incorporates the 
enumeration of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights; suspension of guar-
antees; interpretation and application of the American Convention; organization, func-
tion, competence, and procedure of the Commission; and organization, jurisdiction, 
function, and procedure of the Court. [d. at arts. 3-69. Article I of the American 
Convention obligates the states parties to respect the rights and freedoms listed with the 
American Convention without discriminating as to "race, color, sex, language, status, 
birth, or any other social condition." [d. at art. 1. Article 2 of the American Convention 
requires states parties to adopt domestic legislation to ensure these rights. [d. at art. 2. 
28 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 33-51. 
29 [d. at art. 41; Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Statute), 
reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 4, art. I, at 103; Regulations of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (Regulations), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 4, art. I, 
at 115. 
30 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 41(f), 44. A state party is a member state 
which has ratified the American Convention. Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 306-07. To 
date, states parties to the American Convention include the following states: Argentina, 
Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, EI Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Sur-
iname, Uruguay, and Venezuela (information obtained from the Court). 
'I American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 45. This is a unique aspect of the American 
Convention. Buergenthal, The American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Simi-
larities and Differences, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 155, 159 (1980-81); see the Gallardo case, 4 
SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at para. 22. Only Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Jamaica, Peru, and Venezuela recognize the interstate jurisdiction of the Commission. 
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 12 n.19. 
'2 Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 26(1). This flexibility facilitates the admissibility of 
petitions by eliminating the burden of proving direct and individual harm for standing. 
Cerna, supra note 16, at 316. 
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est strengths33 because it de politicizes the proceedings by not 
requiring a state to involve itself in the human rights situation of 
another state.34 
Second, the Commission's role includes promotional duties 
which traditionally have been fulfilled by lengthy, complex inves-
tigations in member states.35 The Commission conducts investi-
gations to report on the state of human rights in member states 
or to respond to petitions.36 Because the Commission has maxi-
mized its ability to conduct on-site investigations, this power is an 
effective way for the Commission to isolate problem areas for 
OAS General Assembly consideration or to ascertain the relevant 
facts to a dispute. 37 These investigations do, however, require the 
consent or invitation of the domestic government. 38 In cases not 
under its immediate consideration, the Commission has endeav-
ored to promote human rights through the informal use of its 
good offices and mediation.39 
Third, the Commission's role includes encouraging parties in 
the friendly settlement of human rights disputes. Once a dispute 
is declared admissible for the Commission's consideration, the 
petitioners may avail themselves of the Commission's friendly 
33 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 44; the Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra 
note 6, booklet 25, at para. 22. 
34 Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 130; Pena, Human Rights: The Statute of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, resolution adopted October 3, 1979, ACIRES. 448(IX-O/79) , 
21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 735, 738 n.24 (1980); Voglio, The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 65, 73 (1981). 
35 M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 122-44 (1988). 
36 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 41(c). These ongoing reports are included 
in the Commission's Annual Report and then submitted to the OAS General Assembly 
for consideration. Id. at art. 41(g). The OAS General Assembly is the "supreme organ" 
of the OAS. Each member state is entitled to one vote. OAS CHARTER, supra note 17, at 
arts. 52, 54. 
37 In the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Court held that these investigations are not 
mandatory under article 48 of the American Convention. The Velasquez Rodriguez case, 
INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary objections), at paras. 49-50; Cerna, supra 
note 16, at 313-14; Thomas & Thomas, supra note 15, at 338-49. 
38 Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 58. The Commission designates a special commis-
sion to carry out these on-site investigations. Id. at art. 55. The government of the host 
state furnishes the Commission with the necessary facilities, transportation, and security 
to interview, travel, and visit jails, detention and interrogation centers to privately inter-
view inmates and procure documents. !d. at art. 59. See also M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, 
at 132-33. 
39 Good offices are the steps taken by the Commission to encourage negotiation. M. 
QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 139. In mediation, the Commission assists in the negotiation 
of a dispute. Id. at 139-43. 
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settlement procedure.40 The Commission commences this pro-
cedure by requesting information from the parties and may verify 
the facts in on-site investigations.41 The Commission then places 
itself at the parties' disposal to reach a friendly settlement and/ 
or conduct a hearing.42 The Commission's conciliatory function 
offers a more amicable alternative for dispute resolution than the 
binding judgment of a court. 43 If the parties reach a friendly 
settlement, the Commission drafts a brief report which is trans-
mitted to the petitioner, the states parties, and the OAS Secretary 
General for publication.44 If no settlement is reached, the Com-
mission evaluates the evidence and prepares a report which may 
contain its recommendations and conclusions on the matter.45 
This report is sent to the parties and may not be published.46 If 
the matter remains unsettled, the Commission may have an ab-
solute majority declare that the report is to be published in its 
Annual Report to the OAS General Assembly or in any other 
suitable manner.47 Through these activities, the Commission as-
sists the promotion of human rights in the American region. 
B. The Inter-American Court's Role Under the American Convention 
In order to increase and surpass the impact of the American 
Declaration and the Commission's activities, the drafters of the 
American Convention created the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights. 48 Under the American Convention, the Court's pur-
40 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 48(I)(f); Regulations, supra note 29, at 
art. 45; M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 149-50. 
41 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 48. 
42/d. at art. 48(d)-(f); Regulations, supra note 29, at arts. 43-45. 
43 Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 45(3); the Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, 
booklet 25, at para. 24. 
44 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 49; Regulations, supra note 29, at arts. 
45(6),48. 
45 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 50; Regulations, supra note 29, at arts. 
45(6)-(7), 46. 
46 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 50(2); Regulations, supra note 29, at arts. 
47(2),47(6). 
47 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 51(3); Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 
48. 
48 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 52-69. The OAS General Assembly 
approved the Court's Statute in 1979. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 103. The Court adopted 
its Rules of Procedure in 1980. ld. at 157. The Court was officially installed on September 
3, 1979. ld. at 16. The Court completed its headquarter agreements with Costa Rica in 
1981.1d. at 177. Like the Commission, the Court is composed of seven members. American 
Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 34, 52. 
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pose is to apply and interpret the American Convention as an 
"autonomous judicial institution."49 Pursuant to this role, the 
Court is comprised of an adjudicatory (contentious) and an ad-
visory jurisdiction.50 Unlike the Commission's jurisdiction, the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction empowers the Court to hear dis-
putes and decree final binding judgments upon consenting par-
ties.51 Hence, through its contentious jurisdiction, the Court is 
able to enforce the American Convention in individual cases, 
supplement the Commission's efforts, and deter future human 
rights violations by the threat of judicial action. 52 
1. The Court's Contentious Jurisdiction 
The Court's contentious jurisdiction equips the Court with the 
capacity to hear cases, render binding judgments, and adopt 
provisional and remedial measures. 53 First, the parties may use 
the contentious jurisdiction of the Court for disputes concerning 
the interpretation or application of the American Convention.54 
The Court's contentious jurisdiction, however, only extends to 
the Commission and to those states parties that separately declare 
acceptance of this jurisdiction. 55 Second, like the Commission, the 
Court can adopt provisional measures in cases of extreme gravity 
and urgency. 56 This power extends to cases under the Court's 
consideration or to cases which were not submitted to the Court 
at the Commission's request.57 Third, the Court has the remedial 
49 Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court's Statute), reprinted in 
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, art. 1, at 143. 
50 [d. at art. 2. Ten countries have accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction: Argen-
tina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela (information supplied by the Court). 
51 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 63(1). 
52 [d.; Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 160. 
53 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 52, 63. 
54 [d. at arts. 62(3), 63(1). 
55 [d. at art. 61; Court's Statute, supra note 49, at art. 2(10). The declaration can be 
made at any time prior to submitting a case to the Court and may be made "uncondi-
tionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a specific period, or for specific cases." 
American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 62(2). It should be noted that the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction only extends to state, as opposed to private, violations of human 
rights within the American Convention. 
56 [d. at art. 63(2); Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Rules), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 4, art. 23(1), at 157. 
57 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 63(2); Rules, supra note 56, at art. 23(2). 
The European Court of Human Rights was not given this express power although its 
rules did contain the power to take "interim measures." Buergenthal, supra note 31, at 
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power to order that compensation be paid to the injured party.58 
Article 68 of the American Convention mandates that states com-
ply with the Court's judgments. 59 The Court's judgment is final 
and unappealable.60 A state which does not comply with the 
Court's judgment is reported to the OAS General Assembly with 
the Court's recommendations on the matter.61 The OAS General 
Assembly may consider the matter and adopt political measures 
if necessary. 62 Thus, the binding nature of the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction enhances respect for human rights and the American 
Convention system. 
2. The Court's Advisory Jurisdiction 
Through its advisory jurisdiction, the Court may execute non-
binding opinions to clarify state responsibility according to hu-
man rights law.63 Member states may request advisory opinions 
on the Court's interpretation of the American Convention or 
other treaties and the compatibility of their domestic laws with 
these treaties.64 Furthermore, OAS organs may also request ad-
visory opinions on issues within their spheres of competence 
concerning the interpretation of these treaties.65 Because the ad-
162. The ability to take provisional measures is naturally linked to the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction since the measures become the Court's authoritative pronouncement rather 
than a mere opinion. Dunshee de Abranches, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
30 AM. V.L. REV. 79, 109 (1981). 
58 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 63(1). When compensatory damages are 
awarded, the country may execute payment according to domestic procedures. Id. at art. 
68(2). 
59 Id. at art. 68. 
6°Id. at art. 67. From the date of notification of the judgment, however, the parties 
may have ninety days in which to request an interpretation of the judgment. Id. 
61 Id. at art. 65. 
62 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 65. Article 23 of the OAS Charter requires 
that all disputes between American states be submitted to the Charter's "peaceful proce-
dures" before involving the Security Council. OAS CHARTER, supra note 17, at arts. 23-
24; see Buergenthal, supra note 8, at 466-67. The threat of resort to the General Assembly 
to encourage compliance with judgments may be inadequate since "[u]sually, no real, 
fruitful debate takes place on the facts amounting to violations of human rights, on the 
causes thereof, or on the possible solution thereto. The same holds true with regard to 
the specifics of the Commission's activities to prepare the report." M. QUIROGA, supra note 
14, at ISS-56. 
63 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 64. 
64 Id. at art. 64. 
65Id. Organs such as the Inter-American Commission of Women or the Inter-American 
Indian Institute may increase the number of advisory requests in the future. M. QUIROGA, 
supra note 14, at 176-77; see also Note, "Other Treaties"; The Inter-American Court of Human 
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visory opinion is nonbinding, this jurisdiction is available to a 
wider audience than the Court's contentious jurisdiction. The 
Court need not discriminate between states parties to the Amer-
ican Convention and member states to the American Declaration 
or require a declaration of consent. 66 Although the American 
Convention does not explicitly grant individuals the right to re-
quest advisory opinions, individuals may ask a member state or 
an OAS organ to request an opinion on their behalf.67 By sup-
plementing the case law in ambiguous areas, the Court's advisory 
opinions enable member states and OAS organs to uphold their 
human rights obligations more consistently.68 
C. The Procedures Used for Contentious Cases 
To invoke the Court's contentious jurisdiction, a petItioner 
alleging a state's human rights violation must follow procedures 
outlined in the American Convention.69 First, since there is no 
direct access to the Court, the petitioner must send a petition or 
communication to the Commission.70 The Commission deter-
Rights Defines its Advisory Jurisdiction, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 211, 243-44 (1983). The Court 
has limited the advisory requests of OAS organs to issues within the organs' "legitimate 
institutional interest" which is determined by consulting the OAS Charter, constitutiVe 
instruments, and particular practices of the organ. The Commission, however, enjoys an 
absolute right to advisory opinions on issues within its sphere of competence. American 
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 64(1); the Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force 
of the American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), INTER-AM. CT.H.R., Advisory Opinion 
OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, reprinted in 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, paras. 14-16, 
at 87 [hereinafter the Effect of Reservations opinion]. 
66 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 64. 
67 This may occur during a Commission or domestic proceeding, or after the Commis-
sion's proceeding by appeal to the General Assembly to make a request on theit behalf. 
Vargas, Individual Access to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 16 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & 
POL. 601, 613-15 (1984). Therefore, it has been suggested that governments establish 
procedures within their domestic legislation to authorize the requests of domestic tribun-
als. Buergenthal, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 244 (1982). 
68 Buergenthal, supra note 67, at 243. For this reason, the European Court of Human 
Rights has been encouraged to widen the scope of its advisory jurisdiction. VAN DIJK & 
VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 159 
(1984). 
69 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 48-51. 
70 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 46; Regulations, supra note 29, at arts. 
31-41. In order to petition the Commission, the person(s), nongovernmental entity, 
group, or state party must pursue and exhaust all domestic remedies available. Id. These 
requirements may be waived if the domestic arena does not offer an effective remedy, 
the petitioner was denied access to the domestic legal remedies, or there has been un-
warranted delay in providing those remedies. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 
46; Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 37. A petition will be declared inadmissible when 
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mines the admissibility of the petition requiring prior exhaustion 
of all available domestic remedies. 7l Although this process is gen-
erally quite extensive, in serious or urgent cases the Commission 
may consider a petition admissible if it fulfills all the formal 
requirements for admissibility.72 Without indicia of urgency, the 
average petition is presumed admissible while the Commission 
requests information from the defendant state.73 The state has a 
"reasonable period" or ninety days to transmit this information.74 
Second, upon the Commission's receipt of the information 
from the defendant state, the petition's admissibility is reas-
sessed.75 If there are no longer grounds to allege a violation of 
the American Convention, the record is closed.76 If the govern-
ment does not offer information sufficient to rebut the charge, 
the petitioner's allegations are presumed true.77 Thus, at this 
point, the petition becomes admissible. 
Third, the Commission's procedures must be completed. 78 If a 
friendly settlement has not been reached, the Commission pre-
pares a report which is sent to both parties. 79 From the time the 
report is sent, the parties are given three months to settle the 
matter, refer the case to the Court,80 request that the Commission 
submit the case to the Court, or do nothing.8l 
it does not conform to the Commission's requirements or establish a violation of the 
American Convention. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 47. The petition is also 
inadmissible if the Commission finds it to be substantially the same as a prior petition 
studied by the Commission or another international organization. Id. 
7I American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 46-48. 
72Id. at art. 48(2); Regulations, supra note 29, at arts. 34(2), 44(2). The formal require-
ments for admissibility consist of providing information as to the petitioner's name, 
occupation, nationality, account of the violation, victim, and pursuit of domestic remedies. 
Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 32. 
73 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 48(a); Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 
34(3). 
74 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 48(1)(a); Regulations, supra note 29, at 
art. 34(5)-(6). 
75 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 48(1)(b); Regulations, supra note 29, at 
art. 35. 
76 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 48. 
77 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 48(1)(b); Regulations, supra note 29, at 
art. 42. 
78 See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text. As noted supra, during the Commis-
sion's proceedings, the Commission can ask the Court to adopt provisional measures, and 
both the state and the Commission can request advisory opinions from the Court. 
79 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
80 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 51. 
81Id. at art. 51(1); Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 47(2). 
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Fourth, the referral procedure within article 51 of the Ameri-
can Convention enhances cooperation between the Court and the 
Commission.82 The Commission has discretion to refer the case 
to the Court if the state has accepted the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction.83 When a case is referred by the Commission, the 
Commission's position is reversed. 84 Since it is within the primary 
control of the Court's contentious jurisdiction to interpret and 
apply the Convention, the Court is not bound by the Commis-
sion's decisions.85 As the Commission becomes inundated with 
petitions, investigations, and promotional activities, the referral 
procedure allows the Court to assist in the resolution of unsettled 
contentious cases. More importantly, the referral option allows 
both organs to coordinate their jurisdictional realms to assist 
human rights victims.86 
Finally, if the Commission or state party refers the case to the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction, the case proceeds according to 
the Court's Rules of Procedure.87 If a state party decides to refer 
the case to the Court, the party must file an application with the 
Court and include any objections to the Commission's decisions.88 
82 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 51; Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 310; 
Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 160-61; Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 100, 
124. 
83 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 62. 
84 [d. at art. 57. The Commission must appear in all cases before the Court. Court's 
Statute, supra note 49, at art. 28. 
85 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 63-64; Court's Statute, supra note 49, at 
art. 1. In this manner, the American Convention impliedly provides a form of judicial 
review of Commission decisions. Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 113-14; see the 
Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R.,June 26,1987 (preliminary objections), at 
para. 29. The primary goal of upholding the Inter-American system's integrity justifies 
this approach. The Court in the Schmidt opinion stated that the Commission and the 
Court conducted "entirely distinct legal proceedings." Compulsory Membership in an 
Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American 
Convention on Human Rights), INTER-AM. CT.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of Nov. 
13,1985, reprinted in 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.2, paras. 17-18, at 1 [hereinafter 
the Schmidt opinion]. 
86 The cooperation and coordination of the Commission's and Court's roles under the 
American Convention may be disadvantaged by their respective locations in Washington, 
D.C., and Costa Rica. On September 15-16, 1986, at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, 
a joint meeting was held to "coordinate the activities of the two bodies." 2 H.R.1. REPORTER, 
no. 4, 50 (Nov. 1986). The success of this meeting resulted in an agreement to hold yearly 
meetings for the same purpose of "maintain[ing] a close institutional relationship." Id. 
87 Rules, supra note 56. 
88 [d. at art. 25(1). The Court will notify the Commission if a state party submits an 
application. [d. at art. 26(1). The Secretary of the Court also notifies all states parties as 
well as the OAS Secretary General. [d. at art. 26(2). The state party concerned must 
1990] THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 139 
Likewise, the Commission must submit an application if it decides 
to refer the case.89 The Court's proceedings involve written and 
oral stages.90 Before the written proceeding, the Court receives 
preliminary objections which the Court considers or joins to any 
objections on the merits. 9 ) The President of the Court decides all 
time limits for the written and oral proceedings.92 The hearings 
can be public and the judgments are published.93 Since any of 
the procedures governing contentious cases may be applied to 
advisory opinions, it is the nature of the final judgment as op-
posed to the nonbinding opinion that distinguishes the conten-
tious case from the advisory opinion.94 
III. PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT'S 
CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION 
As the mainstay of the American Convention system, the Amer-
ican states created the Court's contentious jurisdiction to protect 
human rights in individual cases, reinforce the Commission's role, 
and deter future violations of human rights. 95 To fulfill these 
laudable goals, the Court's contentious jurisdiction must be 
used.96 In the ten years of its existence, however, the Court has 
heard only two cases.97 This situation may indicate deficiencies 
within the American Convention's framework which discourage 
use of the Court's contentious jurisdiction.98 Although the Court 
has addressed some issues, additional effort may be necessary to 
further encourage its use. 99 This Section first analyzes the general 
designate an agent for service of process and send the necessary communications. [d. at 
art. 26(3). 
89 [d. at art. 25(2). 
90 [d. at art. 28. 
91 Jd. at art. 27. 
92 [d. at arts. 29, 32. 
93 [d. at art. 47; the Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., July 29, 1988 
(merits), at para. 18. 
94 Rules, supra note 56, at art. 53. 
95 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 51, 63; Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 
160. 
96 Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 160. 
97 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), July 29, 1988 (merits); the Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, 
at 1. 
98 See supra note 6; the Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, infra note 153, booklet 25, at 18 
(explanation of vote); the Schmidt opinion, infra note 180, at 50-51 (separate opinion); 
see generally Buergenthal, supra note IS. 
99 See infra III B. 
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problems in establishing an effective regional contentious juris-
diction. Second, solutions are proposed to the specific problems 
within the American Convention which inhibit fruitful use of the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction. Finally, the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction's limited enforcement and deterrence capabilities are 
acknowledged as factors discouraging its utilization. 
A. Increasing the Use of the Court's Contentious jurisdiction: 
General Problems Within the American Region 
In constructing the Court's contentious jurisdiction, the general 
political milieu in Latin America, during the drafting of the 
American Convention and today, affects the present use of the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction. 100 These political factors, which 
hinder the Court's protection of human rights, may also deter 
progressive change in the framework of the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction. 
1. Domestic Sovereignty 
The requirement of a state's consent to the contentious juris-
diction of the Court can prevent petitioners or the Commission 
from referring cases to the Court. 101 Initially, the nonbinding 
nature of the American Declaration in 1948 and the initial dis-
interest in the Court's formation exemplified the member states' 
reluctance to support the protection of human rights with a 
court. 102 Only Costa Rica would agree to the establishment of the 
100 M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 21; Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1147,1159-62,1177; 
Note, supra note 65, at 211, 216; see generally M. CRAHAN, supra note 1, at 25-45. Latin 
American states are those countries which comprise "the part of the American continents 
south of the U.S. in which Romance languages are spoken." THE RANDOM HOUSE DIC-
TIONARY 508 (1978). 
101 Note, supra note 65, at 216-17; see Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 158; Cabranes, 
supra note 14, at 1150, 1177, 1180. For a general discussion, see M. QUIROGA, supra note 
14, ch. II, at 7-65. 
102 Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1148-55. After their liberation from Spain and Portugal, 
Latin American states felt threatened by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. [d. The Roosevelt 
corollary to this doctrine exacerbated the Latin American tendency toward noninterven-
tion by posturing the United States as an "international police power" to protect the 
Western Hemisphere from invasion. [d. at 1149. After World War II, Latin American 
states considered "hemispheric security" necessary. [d. at 1155. For example, the OAS 
Charter's article 2(a) states that an essential purpose of the OAS is "[t]o strengthen the 
peace and security of the continent[.]" OAS CHARTER, supra note 17, at art. 2(a); see also 
id. at art. 27. The OAS Charter of 1948 essentially codified the doctrines of noninterven-
tion and collective self-defense. [d. Article 2(c) of the OAS Charter further lists another 
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Court in its country.103 Because of these noninterventionist sen-
timents, the American Convention included an optional consent 
provision for accepting the Court's contentious jurisdiction. 104 
The optional consent provision provides for ratification of the 
American Convention without acceptance of the Court's conten-
tious jurisdiction.105 By 1988, only ten states had accepted the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction. 106 In 1986, Judge Buergenthal 
as President of the Inter-American Court further explained that 
the primary impediment to consent was the "sheer bureaucratic 
inertia" within the states' governments. 107 Judge Buergenthal sug-
gested that the OAS Permanent Council representatives act as 
envoys and remind their respective governments to accept the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction. lOS As a result, the consent pro-
vision limits the Commission's ability to refer cases. In doing so, 
the consent provision may be a major obstacle to effective con-
tentious jurisdiction and a stronger Inter-American system. 
2. The Inter-American Court's Lack of Visibility 
Effective use of the Court's contentious jurisdiction is frus-
trated by the fact that the general public, including American 
international lawyers and human rights experts, remains unaware 
of the Court's existence. 109 Thus, if a human rights claim has not 
essential purpose of the OAS "[t]o provide for common action on the part of those States 
in the event of aggression," and article 18 provides that "[n]o State or group of States 
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal 
or external affairs of any other State." Id. at arts. 2(c), 18; Cabranes, supra note 14, at 
1156-60. In doing so, the American states aimed to ensure that foreign human rights 
standards would not be externally imposed upon their respective governments. Cabranes, 
supra note 14, at 1160-63. 
103 Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 97. Hence, article 58 of the American 
Convention allowed for the location of the Court to be decided by future agreement. 
American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 58. In 1969, the government of Brazil proposed 
that the Court and the Commission be situated in Fairfax County, Virginia. This proposal 
was rejected. Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 98 n.75. 
104 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 62; see Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1150. 
105 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 62; see Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 
158. 
106 See supra note 50. 
1O? Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 164. Judge Buergenthal also believed that the large 
number of rights contained within the American Convention discouraged its ratification. 
Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 122, 124. 
108 Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 164; Buergenthal, supra note 15, at 122, 124. 
109 Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 305-06. Judge Buergenthal noted that "[p]art of the 
problem here is American provincialism and sheer ignorance when it comes to Latin 
America. If we look abroad at all, we look to Europe ... you can count on one hand the 
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been satisfied by domestic tribunals, legal counsel cannot instruct 
petitioners about the Court's alternative forum. Hence, increased 
use of the Court's contentious jurisdiction may depend upon 
educating the public. Strategic and conservative use of the media 
to call attention to the Court's existence could invite greater use 
of its contentious jurisdiction. llo Likewise, mandatory human 
rights education for students and public servants (especially the 
police) may be absolutely essential for effective human rights 
protection. I I I 
More importantly, the Court could encourage governmental 
cooperation with the Inter-American system by establishing a 
dialogue with the states parties. 112 For example, the location of 
the Court in Costa Rica may have had encouraging side effects. 
The Costa Rican government has requested three out of the nine 
advisory opinions and referred the Court's first contentious 
case. JJ3 Whether Costa Rica's use of the Court reflects its respect 
for human rights or its response to the presence of the Court in 
Costa Rica is unclear.1l4 Since the Court's presence in a state may 
generate its use, it may be advantageous for the Court to consider 
the effect of and response to a proposal to ride circuit in these 
number of North Americans who have studied and written about the inter-American 
human rights system, whereas the number of those who are experts on the European 
system is substantial." Id. In 1980, the Court and the Costa Rican government created 
the Inter-American Institute to combat this problem (general information obtained from 
the Court). 
110 N. SINGH, ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PEACE AND WAR AND THE FUTURE OF 
HUMANITY 138 (1986). See Espiell, supra note 24, at 554. Nongovernmental organizations 
such as Amnesty International have had success in using the press, television, and radio 
to enlighten the general public. The OAS or the Court should consider the power of 
publicity and how it could be used to notify the public about the Court without diminishing 
the Court's prestige. N. SINGH, supra, at 41, 138. 
111 The President of the International Court of Justice credits this approach. N. SINGH, 
supra note 110, at 137-39; Voglio, supra note 34, at 77. 
112 See Voglio, supra note 34, at 71. 
113 The government of Costa Rica submitted the In re Viviana Gallardo (Gallardo) case 
to the Court as well as requesting the Right to Reply,. Schmidt, and Proposed Amendments 
advisory opinions. The Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at 1; Enforce-
ability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1), 1(1), and 2 American Convention 
on Human Rights), INTER-AM. CT.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-7/86 of Aug. 29, 1986, 
reprinted in 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.3, at 17 [hereinafter the Right to Reply 
opinion]; the Schmidt opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.2, at 1; Proposed 
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, INTER-
AM. CT.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984, reprinted in 4 SYSTEM, supra 
note 6, booklet 25.1, at 38 [hereinafter the Proposed Amendments opinion]. 
114 The Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at para. 12. 
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states. 115 The Court could encourage use and acceptance of its 
contentious jurisdiction by elevating the Court's visibility and 
eliminating apprehension through the judicious use of public 
relations efforts. 116 
3. The Fear of Retaliation 
In many Latin American states, the valid fear of retaliation 
accompanying solicitation of domestic judicial relief extends to 
the Court's contentious jurisdiction. ll7 Fear dissuades the victims 
of human rights violations and their domestic lawyers from pur-
suing judicial remedies. I IS For example, in the 1988 Velasquez 
Rodriguez case, the Court's second contentious case, citizens who 
testified were threatened or murdered. llg The Court in the Ve-
lasquez Rodriguez case found that lawyers and judges in Honduras 
had been intimidated, threatened, and tortured. 120 The retalia-
tory action evidenced during the Velasquez Rodriguez case does 
not encourage future petitioners to use the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction for the protection of their human rights. 121 
115 In the United States, the term to "ride circuit" refers to the original manner in 
which judges heard cases by traveling "from place to place within a circuit, holding court 
in various locations." BLACK·S LAW DICTIONARY 125 (5th ed. abr. 1983). A circuit is a 
"(j]udicial division of the United States." Id. 
116 The logistics of this proposal may make it an undesirable alternative. Its foreseeable 
downfalls initially would be governmental consent and financing. Yet, the Commission's 
observations in loco removed many barriers to this option. See generally Norris, Observations 
in Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 15 TEX. 
INT'L L.J. 46 (1980). Likewise, the Court could offer to hold its sessions in different states 
while encouraging utilization of the American Convention system. Authorization within 
the American Convention can be found in article 58 which allows the Court to convene 
in the territory of any member state conditioned upon the state's consent. American 
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 58. For examples of how the Commission sought gov-
ernmental consent during its early years, see generally Norris, supra. This option, however, 
could exacerbate any perceived instability of the Court. 
117 For example, in Bogata, Colombia, on August 17, 1989, fifty of fifty-five appeals 
court judges resigned. Their resignation was in response to the assassination of their 
colleague, appeals court judge Carlos Ernesto Valencia, and the Government's failure to 
provide protection. The Washington Post stated that in the last decade, the death toll for 
Colombian judges was over fifty. Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1989, § A, at 26. 
118 Note, supra note 8, at 297; Voglio, supra note 34, at 78. 
119 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., July 29, 1988 (merits), at paras. 
28(d), 39. In the Velasquez Rodriguez case, there were threats against a surgeon and a 
lawyer who testified at trial. Id. The casualties of this case included the murders of a 
policeman, who was summoned to appear as a witness, and an Alternate Deputy, who 
testified. Id. at paras. 28(c), 28(f), 40, 41. 
120/d. at paras. 78,80,91,93. 
121 See Voglio, supra note 34, at 75-76. 
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In the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the threats and murders forced 
the Court to take provisional measures through its contentious 
jurisdiction. 122 In the future, if the same violent reaction is antic-
ipated, the Court could require the government involved to take 
provisional measures when the case is submitted to the Court 
rather than wait for a violent reaction or the Commission's re-
quest. 123 Although the Court cannot prevent future retaliatory 
action, the Court may mandate creative measures to protect pe-
titioners and witnesses in cases within its contentious jurisdiction. 
B. Increasing the Use of the Court's Contentious jurisdiction: Specific 
Problems Within the American Convention 
Time consuming procedures may discourage use of the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction. 124 The procedural requirements for ac-
cess to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court also reflect the 
American states' noninterventionist sentiments during the draft-
ing of the American Convention. 125 For a state considering ac-
ceptance of the Court's contentious jurisdiction or a petitioner 
hoping to secure the Court's binding judgment, there are five 
disincentives: first, the lack of individual direct access to the 
Court's contentious jurisdiction; 126 second, the Commission's 
lengthy proceedings; 127 third, the lack of coordination between 
the Commission and the Court in referring cases; 128 fourth, the 
accessibility of the advisory jurisdiction as an efficient alternative 
122 The provisional measures consisted of asking the Government to guarantee the 
"safety of the life and property" of two witnesses; prevent further infringements of basic 
rights; investigate the crimes committed; punish the perpetrators; and inform the Court 
of those measures as well as of judicial investigations, public statements, police protection, 
and copies of autopsieslballistic tests. The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER· AM. CT.H.R., 
July 29, 1988 (merits), at paras. 39-43. 
123Id. The provisional measures ordered in the Velasquez Rodriguez case were in response 
to threats against witnesses and requested by the Commission after the referral to the 
Court. The Court may take provisional measures on its own motion if the case is under 
its consideration. American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 63(2). Provisional measures 
for future cases could consist of mandatory police protection of all witnesses, a witness 
relocation and change of identification program, or increased discretion in transmitting 
the names of witnesses. 
124 The Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at 18 (Piza Escalante, expla-
nation of vote). 
125 See supra note 100; the Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, infra note 153, booklet 25, at 18 
(Piza Escalante, explanation of vote). 
126 See infra III B(I). 
127 See infra III B(2). 
128 See infra III B(3). 
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to the Court's contentious jurisdiction; 129 fifth, the insufficient 
enforcement mechanism available to the Court. 130 Although 
many of the specific problems have been addressed by the Court, 
this Section focuses on those areas which could be rectified in 
order to encourage use of the Court's contentious jurisdiction. 
1. The Individual's Indirect Access to the Inter-American 
Court 
Neither an individual, group, legally recognized nongovern-
mental entity, nor state party can directly petition the Court to 
hear a contentious case. 131 The American Convention only pro-
vides petitioners with direct access to the Commission's proce-
dures. 132 Because an individual petitioner must attempt to ex-
haust all domestic remedies, the American Convention permits 
the Commission to receive only those petitions filed within six 
months of a final domestic judgment or the attempted exhaustion 
of available domestic remedies. 133 Considering the lack of public 
awareness of the Inter-American system, the six month provision 
may be an unreasonable barrier to gaining access to the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction. 134 Furthermore, unlike a state which may 
choose to refer a case, the individual petitioner is barred from 
personally referring its case to the Court's contentious jurisdic-
tion. 135 Since the Court's contentious jurisdiction was created to 
protect the individual's human rights, this anomalous restriction 
may deter petitioners from considering the Court as a potential 
forum for their claim. 136 
Three indirect approaches to the Court's contentious jurisdic-
tion may exist for the perseverant individual petitioner. 137 First, 
after the Commission's procedures are completed without a 
129 See infra III B(4). 
130 See infra III B(5). 
131 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 61. 
132 Id. at art. 44. The individual's access to the Commission is a unique aspect of the 
American Convention. The Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at para. 
22; see M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 170; Vargas, supra note 67, at 606. 
U3 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 46. Professor Fernando Voglio, former 
member of the Commission, felt that this rule could prevent access to the Commission 
because of the climate in domestic courts, fear of retaliation, and lack of public awareness 
about recourse to the Inter-American system. Voglio, supra note 34, at 75. 
134 Voglio, supra note 34, at 75. 
135 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 61(1). 
136Id. at art. 33. 
137 Vargas, supra note 67, at 605-09. 
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friendly settlement, the individual petitioner may gain indirect 
access to the Court by requesting that the Commission refer the 
case. 138 Through a referral, the Commission may appoint the 
individual or the individual's lawyer to assist during the case; 
examine the witnesses, experts, and those testifying; or speak at 
the hearing if not heard as a witness. 139 Second, if the Commission 
decides not to refer the case, the individual may request that a 
state party accepting the contentious jurisdiction of the Court 
refer the case on their behalf. 140 Third, the individual may ask a 
state party accepting the Commission's competence for interstate 
petitions to submit the initial complaint to the Commission. 141 
These latter options may be theoretical because of the political 
ramifications of a state's direct intervention into another state's 
affairs.142 Likewise, reliance on the Commission to refer the case 
may not be a judicious choice. 143 Because the Commission's pro-
ceedings must be completed before a referral is made,144 direct 
access to the Court's contentious jurisdiction and/or a more le-
nient time limit for approaching the Commission could encour-
age greater use of the Court's contentious jurisdiction. 
2. The Commission's Proceedings: Discretionary Procedures 
The Commission's proceedings can severely retard the peti-
tioner's indirect access to the Court's contentious jurisdiction. 145 
138 M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 170; Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 122-
23; Vargas, supra note 67, at 606. 
139 Rules, supra note 56, at arts. 21, 37, 38(2); M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 168-70. 
See generally the Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., July 29, 1988 (merits) 
(Piza Escalante, dissenting). 
140 Vargas, supra note 67, at 606-07. However unlikely, access to the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction may be facilitated if a state, representing the interests of the individual, waives 
the Commission's procedures. Because the Court in the Gallardo case did not expressly 
reject this option, interstate disputes may be able to go directly to the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction. 1 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at v, vi (Introduction); Vargas, supra note 
67, at 608-09. 
141 Vargas, supra note 67, at 607. 
142Id. For the same situation in the European system, see VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra 
note 68, at 115. 
143 See, e.g., the Schmidt opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.2, at 1. 
144 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 61(2). 
145 For the Commission's proceedings, see supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. 
For the individual's indirect access to the Court, see supra notes 131-41 and accompanying 
text. See generally the Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R.,July 29, 1988 (merits). 
The drafting of these procedures reflects the states' reluctance to submit to the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction'. The American Convention system was modelled after the Eu-
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Every contentious case must complete the Commission's proce-
dures before being referred to the Court. 146 According to the 
Commission's procedures, a timely petition must be filed with the 
Commission establishing a violation of the American Convention 
which has not been previously considered by the Commission or 
any other international organization. '47 The petition's admissibil-
ity is conditioned upon a finding that all domestic remedies were 
exhausted or unavailable. 148 Unless a case is serious or urgent, 
the Commission requests information from the defendant state, 
evaluates the petition's admissibility, and then offers its assistance 
for a friendly settlement. 149 Unless a friendly settlement is pos-
sible, the Commission's procedures interposed between domestic 
courts and the Court's contentious jurisdiction can preclude at-
tainment of an expedient final judgment. The Court has made 
progress in remedying some of the procedural restrictions to its 
contentious jurisdiction. Since the Court, however, cannot unilat-
erally eliminate all of these handicaps, this Comment proposes 
additional measures to facilitate resort to the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction. 
On the one hand, a state embroiled in a contentious dispute 
may want to formally waive the Commission's proceedings and 
request the Court's assistance in accelerating resolution of the 
case. In the In re Viviana Gallardo (Gallardo) case, the Court's first 
contentious case, the Costa Rican government made such an at-
tempt to secure "speedy judicial process."150 The Gallardo Court 
held that a state could not unilaterally waive the Commission's 
proceedings. '51 Rather than merely affording states an avenue to 
ropean Human Rights system yet adapted to the American political climate of dictatorship, 
violence to attain political power, economic problems, and lack of constitutional govern-
ments. Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1176-77. See generally M. CRAHAN, supra note I, at 39; 
Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 303. 
146 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 61(2). 
147 [d. at arts. 46-47. 
148 [d. at art. 46. 
149 [d. at art. 48. 
150 The Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at para. 13. Having accepted 
the Court's contentious jurisdiction, the Costa Rican government referred the case to the 
Court in 1981 and formally waived the Commission's procedures. [d. at paras. I, 2, 12, 
13. The Commission, however, felt that its procedures should be exhausted before the 
case could be received by the Court's contentious jurisdiction. [d. at para. 9. The Court 
considered the admissibility of the case with its duty to maintain the system's institutional 
integrity by respecting the Commission's purview as well as the individual's right to be 
vindicated within its contentious jurisdiction. [d. at paras. 13, 28. 
151 [d. at para. 28. 
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avoid binding judgments, the Court found that the Commission's 
procedures protected the individual's interest in securing an 
agreement on mutually acceptable terms. 152 Therefore, the Court 
found the state's referral to the Court inadmissible. 153 
On the other hand, a state hoping to avoid a Court judgment 
may want to use the Commission's procedural requirements to 
postpone or escape a referral to the Court's contentious jurisdic-
tion. In 1988, the Honduran government may have employed 
this tactic in the Velasquez Rodriguez case. 154 Unlike Gallardo, the 
Commission referred the Velasquez Rodriguez case to the Court as 
its second contentious case. 155 Although the Honduran govern-
ment had accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction, it ob-
jected to the submission on the ground that many of the Com-
mission's procedures remained unfulfilled. 156 The Court, 
however, found that the American Convention only required that 
the procedures' objectives be satisfied to ensure the parties' pro-
cedural rights. 157 
In addressing the Honduran government's objections, the 
Court removed the procedural impediments which could have 
rendered the Velasquez Rodriguez case inadmissible. 158 In response 
to Honduran claims of procedural errors, the Court found noth-
ing in the American Convention or in the Regulations of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Regulations) re-
quiring the Commission to issue a formal declaration of admis-
152 Id. at para. 24. 
153Id. at para. 28. The Court referred the case back to the Commission retaining it on 
the Court's docket for reconsideration after the procedural requirements had been ex-
hausted. Id. Judge Piza Escalante, while concurring with the judgment, conveyed his 
frustration in a separate vote. He considered the petition inadmissible: 
I do not do so because I consider [the procedures) essential in order to have the 
best protection of human rights but rather I have come to the conclusion that 
unfortunately the system of the Convention appears to make it impossible since 
the American States in drafting it did not wish to accept the establishment of a 
swift and effective jurisdictional system but rather they hobbled it by interposing 
the impediment of the Commission, by establishing a veritable obstacle course 
that is almost insurmountable, on the long and arduous road that the basic rights 
of the individual are forced to travel. 
Id. at 18 (Piza Escalante, explanation of vote). Judge Piza Escalante also noted that the 
Commission's procedural errors in determining admissibility delayed processing the case 
for eighteen months. Id. at para. 26 (Piza Escalante, separate vote). 
154 See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text. The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-
AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary objections), July 29, 1988 (merits). 
155Id. (preliminary objections), at para. 1. 
156Id. at paras. 27, 32. 
157 Id. at para. 33. 
158Id. at paras. 37-41, 49, 53-55, 67, 70, 77, 88. 
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sibility.159 The Court considered the Commission's on-site inves-
tigation and formal hearing procedures to be discretionary.16o 
The Court also determined that the petitioner's burden of ex-
hausting domestic remedies could be expressly or impliedly 
waived by the state unless the government objects in a timely 
manner and proves that effective remedies were not exhausted. 161 
Thus, the Honduran government could not use these procedures 
to resist the referral. 
More importantly, the Court addressed the Honduran govern-
ment's objection that the Commission's procedures were not com-
pleted according to American Convention articles 50 and 51. 162 
The Government objected to the Commission's Resolution 30/83 
sent to the Government in October 1983 because the Commission 
had failed to label it "the report" pursuant to these articles. 163 
The Court found the resolution to be "the report" and the state's 
right to adequate time to respond to the report unimpaired. 164 
In evaluating the validity of these objections and perhaps consid-
ering the five year lapse between contentious cases, the Court 
expiated those procedures which could have precluded it from 
hearing the case. 
The Velasquez Rodriguez Court refrained from strictly inter-
preting the procedural requirements while justifying Commission 
discretion and facilitating access to the Court's contentious juris-
diction. 165 The Court emphasized the importance of the Com-
159 [d. at paras. 37-41. 
160 [d. at paras. 49, 53, 54. The Commission's hearing procedures may not be discre-
tionary, however, if the parties request a hearing. [d. Since the Honduran government 
did not request the hearing, it was barred from objecting. [d. at paras. 53-55; American 
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 48(l)(d)-(e). 
161 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), at para. 88. Since the Government did not make a timely objection, it was 
precluded from objecting. The Court's "timely requirement" was inferred from the pur-
pose of the American Convention. The Court noted, "The rule of prior exhaustion must 
never lead to a halt or delay that would render international action in support of the 
defenseless victim ineffective." [d. at para. 93. 
162 [d. at para. 77. 
163 [d. at para. 67. Article 51 gave the Government three months to decide whether to 
settle, ignore "the report", or refer the case to the Court. American Convention, supra 
note 4, at arts. 50-51. 
164 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), at paras. 67, 70, 77. 
165/d. at para. 33. The Court noted in the Velasquez Rodriguez case that strict procedural 
compliance was not necessary in an international forum as long as the procedures are 
satisfied according to their purpose and the procedural rights of the parties. /d.; Note, 
supra note 8, at 294. 
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mission's procedures and their objectives to seek extra-judicial 
dispute resolutions and states' compliance with their obligation 
to cooperate in the resolution of a contentious case. 166 Forced to 
prioritize among countervailing considerations, the Court inter-
preted the American Convention in favor of the individual while 
maintaining the framework of the system. 167 From this stand-
point, the Court absolved the Velasquez Rodriguez case of those 
procedural impediments able to obstruct an individual's access to 
its contentious jurisdiction. 
The Court's view of the Commission's friendly settlement pro-
cedure in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, however, may have further 
impaired access to the Court's contentious jurisdiction. According 
to the Gallardo case, a state willing to use the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction for an expedient end to a dispute may be estopped 
by the individual petitioner'S interest in the friendly settlement 
procedure. 168 Yet, a state willing to participate in this procedure 
can be estopped by the Commission's discretionary refusal to 
offer its conciliatory assistance. 169 Since the procedure'S purpose 
is to encourage a friendly settlement upon consent, the incon-
gruous role this procedure played in these two cases may dis-
courage states from submitting to the Commission's absolute dis-
cretion in addressing contentious cases. Thus, the Court's position 
in the Velasquez Rodriguez case may further deter states from 
accepting the Court's contentious jurisdiction. 
Victims of human rights violations or their petitioners have a 
natural interest in a speedy recovery especially when involving 
the right to life. 170 In the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Court's 
evaluation of the competing interests in fulfilling the Commis-
sion's procedures may not ensure the individual's interest in the 
prompt resolution of a contentious case. l7l While balancing the 
166 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), at paras. 58-59. 
167 See the Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at para. 16. 
168 [d. at paras. 24, 28. 
169 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), at paras. 44-45. The Court found the Honduran government's denial of the 
forced disappearances of persons by state authorities not to be conducive to a friendly 
settlement. [d. at para. 46. 
170 See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text. 
171 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), at paras. 69-70. The Velasquez Rodriguez case was the result of a petition 
brought on behalf of Manfredo Velasquez. [d. (merits), at para. 3. A student at the 
National Autonomous University of Honduras, Rodriguez was "kidnapped" on September 
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procedures' purpose in encouraging state cooperation and en-
suring the procedural rights of the state, the Court condoned the 
Commission's unauthorized grant to the Government of exten-
sions to submit information. 172 After a government receives the 
Commission's report, the deadlines in the American Convention's 
article 51 and the Commission's Regulations reflect the general 
goal of an expeditious consideration of frequently urgent human 
rights matters. 173 The Court in the Velasquez Rodriguez case re-
frained from chastising the Commission for jeopardizing the "pe-
titioner's right to obtain the international protection offered by 
12, 1981. /d. at para. 147. The petitioner claimed that he "was violently detained without 
a warrant for his arrest by members of the National Office of Investigations (DNI) and 
G-2 of the Armed Forces of Honduras," then put in a cell, tortured, and never returned. 
Id. at paras. 3, 188. The Velasquez Rodriguez case began with a petition to the Commission 
in October 1981 and ended with a Court judgment in 1988. Id. at paras. I, 194. On 
September 17, 1981, and February 6, 1982, Zenaida Velasquez unsuccessfully attempted 
to procure a writ of habeas corpus from the Honduran courts. The victim's father and 
sister brought criminal complaints on November 9, 1982, without result. Finally, Zenaida 
Velasquez joined another party in bringing a criminal action on April 5, 1984, which was 
dismissed except in regard to the missing General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez. The First 
Court of Appeals dismissed their case on January 16, 1986, for lack of evidence. Id. at 
paras. 74-75. In October 1983, the Commission adopted Resolution 30/83 and requested 
that the Government submit information concerning the case within sixty days or the 
allegations would be presumed true. Id. (preliminary objections), at paras. 19, 68. The 
Government requested reconsideration of the resolution since domestic remedies were 
pending. /d. at paras. 20, 68. Although the American Convention does not expressly 
provide for this request, the Commission subsequently granted two extensions until mid-
April 1985 to procure additional information. Id. at paras. 21, 22, 68-69; Id. (merits), at 
para. 7. The Honduran government finally offered information to the effect that the 
criminal complaint had been dismissed. The First Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. 
Id. (merits), at para. 74. Since the Government's information remained insufficient to 
overcome the presumption, the Commission denied the third request for reconsideration 
in April 1986 and decided to submit the case to the Court's contentious jurisdiction. Id. 
(preliminary objections), at para. 24. The Government objected to the lack of an additional 
sixty days following the second resolution. /d. at para. 72. The Court did not find these 
extensions to be violations of the Commission's procedural requirements. Id. at para. 69. 
Since the extensions were requested by the Government, the Court found them not to 
impair the procedural interests of the state because the amount of time granted to the 
Government was already excessive and had seriously impaired the petitioner's right to an 
expedient decision. Id. at paras. 68, 70, 72, 74. 
172 Id. (preliminary objections), at paras. 69, 70. Although not mentioned by the Court, 
article 34(6) of the Commission's Regulations does allow the Commission to grant a thirty 
day extension. Regulations, supra note 29, at art. 34(6). The article further states, however, 
mat "in no case shall extensions be granted for more than 180 days after the date on 
which the first communication is sent to [the] government of the state concerned." Id. 
173Id. at para. 93. Furthermore, the American Convention's article 25 guarantees the 
individual "the right to a simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, 
before a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate one's fun-
damental rights .... " American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 25. 
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the Convention within the legally established time frames."174 The 
extensions resulted in postponing the Court's consideration of 
the case for 3.5 years after the initial communication. 175 Since 
article 51 is the only route to the Court's contentious jurisdiction, 
the use of extensions can extinguish the petitioner'S hope for a 
prompt referral. 
While the use of extensions mayor may not foster state coop-
eration with the American Convention system, the Commission 
may not be the appropriate organ to grant them. Cognizant of 
their detrimental effect on the petitioner's interests, the Velasquez 
Rodriguez Court limited its acceptance of extensions to those 
which are "timely and reasonable."176 Considering the Commis-
sion's judgment in the Velasquez Rodriguez case and the ambiguity 
of a "timely and reasonable" requirement, perhaps the interests 
in state cooperation and the efficient protection of human rights 
would best be preserved by amending the American Convention 
and/or the Commission's Regulations. By allocating the Commis-
sion's control over extensions or other exercises of procedural 
discretion to the Court, the Court could evaluate the judiciousness 
of an extension rather than react to its consequences. 177 By doing 
so, unnecessary delays in procuring justice could be alleviated. 
3. Referrals to the Court's Contentious Jurisdiction 
The Commission's discretion to refer cases to the Court's con-
tentious jurisdiction may be detrimental to its use. Once the Com-
174 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), at para. 69. 
175 Without noting the Commission's Regulations, the Court found that the Commission 
gave the government 2.5 extra years to procure the information; [d. at para. 70. The 
Court delivered its judgment on the preliminary objections on June 26, 1987. 
176 [d. at para. 69. 
177 In this manner, the Court could ensure the delicate equilibrium of interests protected 
by the American Convention. Considering the amount of cases it has heard, the Court 
may have more time available to analyze these matters. In his separate vote, Judge Piza 
Escalante expressed a similar viewpoint in the Gallardo case: 
[E]xcept for the procedure of conciliation, I believe that nothing the Commission 
might be able to do, within the procedures set forth in the Convention, in the 
interest of an effective protection of human rights, the Court itself cannot do 
during the proceedings; and do it even better, since its intervention would add 
certainty and authority to the proceedings and, at the same time, would reduce 
considerably the length of the proceedings, contributing to the fulfillment of the 
ideal of prompt and full justice, the absence of which is one of the most serious 
and frequent violations of human rights, and source and guardian of almost all 
of the rest. 
The Gallardo case, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at 18 (Piza Escalante, explanation 
of vote). 
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mission's proceedings are completed without reaching a friendly 
settlement, article 51 allows the state or the Commission to refer 
the case to the Court's contentious jurisdiction. 178 At this point, 
the Commission has the discretion to make a referral since the 
individual cannot and the state may not have the incentive to 
refer the case. 179 There are two pitfalls with the issue of discre-
tionary referrals: the first is the small number of states which 
accept the contentious jurisdiction of the Court,IBO and the second 
is the lack of guidance within the American Convention as to 
which cases should be referred. IBI 
In the 1985 advisory opinion, Compulsory Membership in an As-
sociation Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Schmidt), 
the Court dealt specifically with the issue of when the Commission 
should refer a case. IB2 The Schmidt Court found that there were 
certain cases for which containment within the Commission's pro-
ceedings impaired the American Convention system IB3 and the 
petitioner's interests in adjudicating his case. IB4 The Court con-
sidered the Schmidt case an example of a case which should have 
been referred to its contentious jurisdiction. IB5 The Schmidt case 
contained a perplexing legal conflict which had not been consid-
ered by the Court and raised issues pertinent to other states. IB6 
Because of this, the Court found that the Commission had an 
implied nonlegal obligation within the American Convention to 
refer the Schmidt case and other similar cases. IB7 Hence, the 
Schmidt advisory opinion may have established the criteria to 
guide the Commission in referring future cases. Perhaps as a 
178 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 51. 
179Id. 
180 See supra III A; Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 164. 
181 Vargas, supra note 67, at 606. 
182 The Schmidt opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.2, at 1. 
183 /d. at para. 26. Judge Maximo Cisneros wrote a separate opinion expressing his 
displeasure with the lack of referrals: 
I wish to say that the "love" that we have put into our work has not been sufficient 
to avoid the sense of frustration that I feel in leaving the Court before it has 
had the opportunity to hear a single case of a violation of human rights, in spite 
of the sad reality of our America in this field. 
/d. at para. 10 (Cisneros, declaration). He noted, in particular, the problem that individuals 
do not have standing before the Court obligated the Commission to invoke the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction. Id. 
184 Id. at paras. 24-26. The Court found that since the individual petitioner could not 
refer the case and the Government had no incentive to refer the case, the Commission 
should have referred the Schmidt case. Id. 
185Id. at para. 25. 
186Id. 
187 Id. at paras. 24-26. 
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result of the Schmidt opinion, the newly elected Commission sent 
three cases to the Court's contentious jurisdiction in 1986. 188 
Although the reaction to the Schmidt case may have encouraged 
referrals to the Court's contentious jurisdiction, there are draw-
backs to the Court's opinion. Though the Commission must refer 
certain cases, it retains the discretion to determine which cases 
must be referred according to the ambiguous guidelines supplied 
by the Schmidt case. 189 There may be various solutions to this 
problem. 
First, since binding judgments are necessary corollaries to the 
system, it has been suggested that the Commission should simply 
refer as many cases as possible even if they do not appear to 
present legal issues. 19o Second, the Commission could ask the 
Court to determine if a case should be referred by the Commis-
sion through an advisory opinion. 191 This approach, however, 
would simply further delay access to the Court's contentious ju-
risdiction. Third, increased use of the Court's contentious juris-
diction could be achieved with a concrete referral procedure. 192 
A concrete referral procedure could alleviate unnecessary re-
strictions to the Court's contentious jurisdiction. There are certain 
human rights cases which may necessitate mandatory referral 
provisions within the American Convention. 193 A concrete refer-
188 See supra notes 2, 7. 
189 See M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 324. 
190 [d. Since the Commission's proceedings do not concern an analysis of the legal issues 
involved, it may be difficult for the Commission to perceive which case must be referred. 
[d. In the European human rights system, the Commission has the full discretion to refer 
a case. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 68, at 116. In that system, there has also been 
difficulty in deciding which cases should be referred to the Court. [d. The following 
criteria have been used for references: the case is particularly appropriate for a judicial 
body, the case raises a fundamental issue of the European Convention's application, the 
Commission is undecided as to whether a violation has occurred. [d. A crucial difference 
in the European human rights system is that it has a political organ, the Committee of 
Ministers, to which the Commission can refer a case. [d. The Court in the Schmidt opinion 
encouraged the Commission to refer contentious cases by emphasizing that the Commis-
sion had no obligation to conclusively find a human rights violation before a referral. 
The Schmidt opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.2, at para. 24. 
191 See M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 329. 
192 See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text. 
193 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), July 29, 1988 (merits). For example, in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, a petition 
was filed with the Commission on October 7, 1981. [d. (preliminary objections), at para. 
15. On October 14 and November 24, 1981, the Commission forwarded the petition to 
the Honduran government and requested a response on October 14 and November 24, 
1981; May 14 and October 6, 1982; and March 23 and August 9, 1983. [d. at paras. 16, 
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ral provision could minimize the time consuming delays gener-
ated by uncooperative governments which have accepted the con-
tentious jurisdiction of the Court. The American Convention 
could be amended to at least provide the Commission with the 
power to refer a case the first or second time the government 
fails to respond to a request for information. A better option 
could be to include a provision mandating the Commission's re-
ferral when confronted with any violation of article 43, which 
obligates states to provide information at the Commission's re-
quest. 194 Since the purpose of the Commission's procedures is to 
encourage state cooperation,195 immediate removal of the case to 
the Court's contentious jurisdiction does not forfeit this goal when 
dealing with uncooperative governments. The American Conven-
tion system should not allow disrespect of its provisions by a state 
which has voluntarily agreed to the system. Increased respect for 
the Inter-American system could encourage its use and reinforce 
its ability to effectively protect human rights. 196 
In order to establish a concrete referral provision, the Treaty 
of Rome's (EEC Treaty) article 177 offers a model. 197 The EEC 
Treaty's preliminary reference procedure within article 177 re-
quires domestic courts of final resort to refer cases to the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (European Court of 
Justice).198 The domestic court must apply the European Court 
17, 18. There was no reply. Id. at para. 18. The Court in its judgment of July 29, 1988, 
was forced to hold, "The context in which the disappearance occurred and the lack of 
knowledge seven years later as to the victim's fate are sufficient to reasonably conclude 
that Manfredo Velasquez was killed." Id. (merits), at para. 188. Indeed, there was testi-
mony that the armed forces had tortured him and "killed him with a knife and machete 
... dismembered his body and buried the remains in different places .... " Id. at para. 
113. The limited amount of justice the Court's contentious jurisdiction can offer should 
not require the endurance of the petitioner in the Velasquez Rodriguez case. See id. at para. 
189. 
194 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 43. Article 43 states that "[t]he States 
Parties undertake to provide the Commission with such information as it may request of 
them as to the manner in which their domestic law ensures the effective application of 
any provision of this Convention." Id. 
195 The Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-AM. CT.H.R., June 26, 1987 (preliminary 
objections), at para. 59. 
196 See Buergenthal, supra note 67, at 245; Voglio, supra note 34, at 76-77. 
197 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. II, at art. 177 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
198 This Court must be distinguished from the European Court of Human Rights 
(European Court). EEC Treaty, supra note 197, pt. 5, tit. I, ch. I, at art. 177; D. WYATT 
& A. DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 77-80 (1987); see C.I.L.F.I.T. v. 
Ministry of Health, I Comm. Mkt. L.R. 472 (1983) [hereinafter C.I.L.F.I.T.]. Under 
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of Justice's preliminary ruling if it is applicable. 199 A similar fea-
ture within the American Convention could offer the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction the chance to hear more cases de novo. 
By doing so, the contentious judgments could increase the clarity 
and utility of American Convention law while supporting the 
Commission's role. 20o 
4. The Boundaries of the Court's Advisory Jurisdiction 
Having accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction, a state's 
ability to request an advisory opinion during the Commission's 
proceedings presents a major threat to the prospects of a refer-
ra1.201 If the Court allows a state to evade its binding judgment 
in this manner, the usefulness of its contentious jurisdiction would 
dissipate. 202 For a state intent upon securing an efficient resolu-
tion of a contentious dispute, however, requesting an advisory 
opinion may appear to be the more favorable alternative. Among 
its advantages, an advisory request can procure a prompt non-
binding judicial opinion.203 As an outgrowth of the doctrine of 
article 177, domestic courts retain their discretion to refer appealable decisions. 
C.l.L.F.l.T., supra, at para. 6. 
199 D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 198, at 77-80. 
200 Judge Buergenthal also notes this beneficial prospect yet likens the European Eco-
nomic Community system's provision to the Court's advisory jurisdiction. Buergenthal, 
supra note 67, at 243 n.64. 
201 See the Schmidt opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.2, at para. 22; Buergen-
thai, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 127, 134-38 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1984); Buergenthal, The Advisory 
Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-12 (1985); 
Vargas, supra note 67, at 614; Note, supra note 65, at 234-36. 
202 "Other Treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American 
Convention on Human Rights), INTER-AM. CT.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 
24, 1982, reprinted in 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, para. 24, at 69 [hereinafter the 
Other Treaties opinion]. The drafters of the European Convention on Human Rights 
were aware of this danger and severely restricted access to the advisory jurisdiction of 
the European Court to the Committee of Ministers which must muster a two thirds 
majority vote for a request concerning any proceeding unrelated to the European Con-
vention, the content or scope of the rights within the European Convention, or the 
European Convention Protocols. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 68, at 159; Dunshee 
de Abranches, supra note 57, at 107. These restrictions were placed on the European 
Court's advisory jurisdiction to protect against weakening its contentious jurisdiction and 
discouraging acceptance. Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 107. 
203 Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Hu-
man Rights), INTER-AM. CT.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983, reprinted in 4 
SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.1, para. 26, at 3 [hereinafter the Death Penalty opinion]; 
Buergenthal, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 127, 146 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1984); Note, supra note 65, at 217. 
1990] THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 157 
nonintervention, the advisory jurisdiction allows states to inquire 
about human rights law without being declared a violator.204 Un-
like the political and legal ramifications of accepting the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction, use of the advisory jurisdiction by mem-
ber states does not implicate the same concerns.205 Hence, the 
international community may perceive a state's compliance with 
human rights law as voluntary.206 Significant developments have 
been made by the Court to combat the potential of the advisory 
jurisdiction to impinge upon the Court's contentious jurisdic-
tion.207 This progress, however, may not be able to guarantee 
effective use of the Court without eradicating the aforementioned 
burdens on its contentious jurisdiction.208 
a. Procedural Limitations on the Advisory Jurisdiction: 
Admissibility 
Stimulating the use of the Court's contentious jurisdiction may 
depend upon restricting access to its advisory jurisdiction.209 The 
drafters of the American Convention departed from other re-
gional and international models in the design of the uniquely 
broad scope of the Court's advisory jurisdiction.21o The Court 
was left to formulate its own criteria for admissible requests.211 
In that endeavor, the Court retained its discretion to determine 
admissibility on a case-by-case basis.212 
In particular, the Court was wary of allowing use of the advisory 
jurisdiction to impair the system or to avoid the Court's conten-
The state can request an advisory opinion during the Commission's proceedings as well 
as at anytime. Furthermore, unlike the Court's contentious jurisdiction, under its advisory 
jurisdiction, the Court can consider the merits of a case at the same time as the jurisdic-
tional objections to determine whether the case may be a disguised contentious case. The 
Death Penalty opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.1, at para. 28. A case may be 
considered a "disguised contentious case" if an advisory opinion is requested during a 
dispute within the Commission's proceedings and the state has not accepted the conten-
tious jurisdiction. See Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights 
Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 8-12 (1985). 
204 Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 159-60. 
205 Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 89. 
206 See Buergenthal, supra note 203, at 147. 
207 See infra III B(4)(a)-(b). 
208 See supra III A, III B(1)-(3). 
209 See infra notes 220-239 and accompanying text. 
210 The Other Treaties opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at paras. 14-18. 
211Id. at paras. 26-27. 
212Id. at paras. 27-28. 
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tious jurisdiction.213 Yet, in the 1982 advisory opinion, "Other 
Treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Other Trea-
ties), the Court required "compelling reasons" to accompany its 
refusal of a request.214 In this opinion, the Court found a request 
which would diminish the utility of its contentious jurisdiction to 
be a compelling reason for its refusal. 215 
Although the "compelling reasons" guideline retained the 
Court's discretion to refuse requests to protect its contentious 
jurisdiction, it may have been too vague to adequately control the 
scope of the advisory jurisdiction. For example, in the 1983 ad-
visory opinion, Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Death Penalty), the 
Court restated that it would not permit an advisory opinion to 
weaken its contentious jurisdiction.216 The Court, however, char-
acterized its advisory jurisdiction as a valid alteFnative to using its 
contentious jurisdiction.217 The Court's adherence to this inter-
pretation resulted in admitting the Commission's request for an 
advisory opinion. The Commission later used the opinion, how-
ever, to support its position in a contentious dispute with a state 
which had not accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction.218 
Thus, the Death Penalty opinion implies that the Commission may 
use the advisory jurisdiction for a similar dispute with a state 
accepting the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. By facilitating 
access to its advisory jurisdiction, the Court's alternative forum 
approach may not encourage referrals to its contentious jurisdic-
tion.219 
By 1985, the Court seemed to have reconsidered its approach 
to disguised contentious cases.220 In the Schmidt opinion, the 
Court clarified some of the confusion in the admissibility require-
ments for advisory requests.221 Although the Costa Rican govern-
... [d. at para. 24. 
214 [d. at para. 31. The International Court of Justice also uses this guideline. [d. at 
para. 23; Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in 2 THE FUTURE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 499,505 (L. Gross ed. 1976). 
215 The Other Treaties opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25, at paras. 24-25, 
31; Note, supra note 65, at 243. 
216 The Death Penalty opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.1, at paras. 28, 36. 
217 [d. at paras. 43-45; Buergenthal, supra note 203, at 1,9-12. 
218 [d.; M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 181. 
219 Since the Court's contentious jurisdiction was not used between 1981-86, the Death 
Penalty Court may have been reluctant to further limit the Court's accessibility. 
220 The Schmidt opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.2, at 1. 
221 [d. at paras. 22-23. An individual petitioner initiated this case by alleging that the 
Costa Rican government had violated human rights with the American Convention. [d. 
at para. 19. 
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ment had accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction, the 
Schmidt case was not referred to the Court. 222 Yet, after success-
fully completing the Commission's proceedings, the Government 
requested an advisory opinion regarding certain legal issues.223 
The Court stated that if the Government had lost in the Com-
mission's proceedings, a subsequent appeal to the advisory juris-
diction would have been an inadmissible attempt to overturn the 
Commission's decision without facing the threat of a binding 
judgment. 224 While the Court did not explicitly restrict access to 
the advisory jurisdiction to states which have not accepted its 
contentious jurisdiction, the Schmidt opinion may have had a com-
parable effect.225 By finding the obligation to refer certain cases 
and eliminating the possibility of certain appeals, the Court re-
inforced its "compelling reasons" standard with additional ad-
missibility requirements for advisory requests. 226 Although this 
progress cannot eliminate every factor discouraging invocation 
of the Court's contentious jurisdiction, the Schmidt opinion may 
help remedy any underutilization caused by the misuse of the 
Court's advisory jurisdiction. 
b. Substantive Limitations on the Scope of Article 64(1) 
Like the admissibility requirements for advisory opinions, the 
accessibility of the Court's advisory jurisdiction to clarify certain 
legal issues affects the vitality of its contentious jurisdiction. Ar-
ticles 64( 1) and (2) circumscribe the substantive scope of the 
Court's advisory jurisdiction.227 The Court's power to give advi-
sory opinions on the interpretation of the American Convention 
or other treaties is found in article 64(1) while article 64(2) per-
mits advisory opinions on the compatibility of domestic laws with 
the American Convention and other treaties. 228 The Court has 
tailored the substantive scope of its advisory jurisdiction in three 
222Id. at para. 20. 
223Id. at para. 11. The Court responded by finding that the Commission had an implied 
obligation to refer this case. Id. at paras. 24-25. 
224Id. at para. 22. Because Costa Rica had won the Commission's proceedings, it could 
not legally gain from the advisory opinion; and therefore, its request was deemed admis-
sible. Id. at para. 23. 
225 /d. at paras. 22-23, 25. 
226/d. 
227 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 64(1)-(2). See generally the Right to Reply 
opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.3, at paras. 9-11. 
228 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 64(1)-(2). 
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advisory opinions by interpreting article 64 to prescribe the 
bounds of its contentious jurisdiction.229 
The Court initially perceived the substantive division in article 
64 to be insignificant.23o By 1986, however, the Court decided to 
differentiate between the substantive scope of articles 64( 1) and 
(2).231 In the 1986 advisory opinion, Enforceability of the Right to 
Reply or Correction (Right to Reply), the Costa Rican government 
questioned whether the American Convention was self-executing 
or whether the states were required to adopt implementing leg-
islation.232 Since the Government did not classify its request in 
the petition explicitly according to the subsections of article 64, 
the Court found it admissible under article 64( 1) and refused to 
consider the related issues of domestic law under article 64(2).233 
The Court's decision to substantially restrict the legal issues con-
sidered under article 64( 1) perplexed three out of the seven 
judges.234 Because the opinion offers no illuminating dicta, the 
Court's strict interpretation of article 64(1) might reflect mere 
judicial discretion. 
229 The Right to Repiy opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.3, at 17; the Schmidt 
opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.2, at I; the Proposed Amendments opinion, 
4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.1, at 38. 
230 The Proposed Amendments opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.1, at para. 
7. In the 1984 opinion, Proposed Amendments to the Naturaliwtion Provisions of the Constitution 
of Costa Rica (Proposed Amendments), the Costa Rican government requested an article 64(2) 
advisory opinion on the compatibility of a proposed amendment to their constitution with 
the American Convention. [d. The Court admitted the request but found that, by refor-
mulating the question, the same question could be answered under article 64(1). [d. at 
para. 16. Reiterating that a mere procedural distinction existed between articles 64(1) and 
(2), the Court in the 1985 Schmidt opinion found the invocation of both subsections to be 
an appropriate form of request. The Schmidt opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 
25.2, at para. 16. Thus, for two years, the Court did not distinguish between articles 64(1) 
and (2). See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text. 
231 See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
232 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 1(1),2,14(1); the Right to Reply opinion, 
4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.3, at paras. 13, 16-17. 
233 The Right to Reply opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.3, at para. 10. 
Through the Government's reference to article 64(I)'s procedural rules, the Court found 
it to be an article 64(1) request. Id. at para. 18. The Court stated that requests exclusively 
concerning domestic law or treaties other than the American Convention fall outside the 
scope of article 64(1). Id. at para. 11. Furthermore, composite questions relating to both 
the interpretations of the American Convention and an inadmissible question which could 
not be separated would be inadmissible. Id. at para. 12. 
234 Id. at para. 35. Judge Piza Escalante stated that the Right to Reply opinion preserved 
the traditional concept of domestic precedence over international law. Id. at paras. 13-14 
(Piza Escalante, separate opinion). Judge Piza Escalante does not dissent specifically on 
this issue. Considering the intended breadth of the Court's advisory jurisdiction, the 
article 64(1) restriction appeared arbitrary to Judge Piza Escalante since the narrower 
contentious jurisdiction can address the same domestic legal issues. Id. at para. 18. 
1990] THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 161 
The decision to constrict the scope of article 64( 1) may also 
reflect the Court's desire to preserve the utility of its contentious 
jurisdiction. Article 64(1) opinions interpreting the American 
Convention are particularly useful for disputes within the Com-
mission's proceedings that concern the American Convention's 
violation. Unlike the member states, the Commission can only 
request an advisory opinion under article 64(1).235 If the Com-
mission could procure advisory opinions addressing the related 
issues of domestic law to buttress its position in a contentious 
dispute, the opinion could actually determine whether a human 
rights violation has occurred. This would allow the Commission's 
jurisdiction to supplant the role of the Court's contentious juris-
diction and frustrate the states' right to consent to this de facto 
judgment.236 Because of the Right to Reply opinion, advisory opin-
ions under article 64(1) are limited to a mere restatement of the 
American Convention. 237 A state seeking to legally justify its po-
sition within the Commission's proceedings may find it more 
advantageous to refer the case. Thus, the Court may have de-
creased the utility of article 64( 1) to encourage referrals to its 
contentious jurisdiction. 
It is equally conceivable that the Court intended to delimit the 
scope of article 64( 1) in the Right to Reply opinion to encourage 
article 64(2) requests.238 With article 64(2) opinions, the Court 
can exert a more direct effect on the domestic laws of American 
states in keeping with its goal to deter future human rights vio-
lations.239 The actual effect of the Right to Reply opinion, however, 
must be revealed in future cases. 
5. The Role of Publicity as an Enforcement Mechanism 
The Court's contentious jurisdiction is an essential component 
of the American Convention system.240 The American Conven-
tion system needs an effective contentious jurisdiction to protect 
235 American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 64(1). 
236 The Death Penalty opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 25.1, at paras. 21, 22, 
39. 
237 The Right to Reply opinion, 4 SYSTEM, sUfrm note 6, booklet 25.3, at para. c (Piza 
Escalante, separate opinion). 
288 This may be true since out of a total of nine opinions, seven requests have been 
made under article 64(1), one was made under article 64(2), and one was made under 
both articles. See generally Voglio, supra note !l4, at 71. 
lag For example, see the Proposed Amendments opinion, 4 SYSTEM, supra note 6, booklet 
2.!U, at !l8. 
140 Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 124-25. 
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the interests of human rights victims in specific cases, support 
the Commission's efforts, and function as a deterrence mecha-
nism.241 The role of the Court's contentious jurisdiction in vin-
dicating petitioners' rights is a necessary corollary to the protec-
tion of human rights because it offers the opportunity to satisfy 
claims unequivocally.242 Thus, recourse to this arena for dispute 
resolution must be made accessible and effective. 
The ability of the American Convention system to protect hu-
man rights depends upon use of the Court's contentious jurisdic-
tion.243 The American Convention envisioned the interdepend-
ence of the Commission and the Court.244 If the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction fails to be invoked frequently in response 
to human rights violations, the recognition accorded to its advi-
sory opinions necessarily suffers.245 This in turn thwarts reliance 
by the states, the Commission, and other OAS organs upon the 
Court's advisory opinions.246 Hence, the Inter-American system 
depends upon a working contentious jurisdiction to enhance the 
validity of the system.247 
The degree of respect states accord the Court's judgments is 
an important factor in deterring governmental violations of hu-
man rights. The Court's application of human rights law to re-
solve contentious cases motivates states to satisfy their human 
rights obligations.248 Yet, in order to generate the respect essential 
to empower the Court's judgments, states must be committed to 
recognizing human rights and view the Court as an impartial, 
efficient tribunal able to enforce its judgments.249 To a certain 
extent, the impact of the Court's judgments can only be as sub-
stantial as the deterrent power within the sanctions available to 
241 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 51, 63; Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 
160; Buergenthal, supra note 67, at 245. 
242 American Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 63(1), 68; N. SINGH, supra note 110, at 
10-11; Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 124. 
243 Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 310; Buergenthal, supra note 26, at 833. 
244 Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 124. 
245 Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 160. 
246 [d. 
247 Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 310; Buergenthal, supra note 203, at 147; Note, supra 
note 65, at 245. Judge Buergenthal noted that the advisory jurisdiction could only work 
in conjunction with the Court's contentious jurisdiction "to give teeth to the advisory 
process." Buergenthal, supra note 217, at 26. 
248 N. SINGH, supra note 110, at 10-11; Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, at 124. 
249 N. SINGH, supra note 110, at 11-12 (preface); Dunshee de Abranches, supra note 57, 
at 106. 
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enforce them.250 Yet, reluctant to relinquish their sovereignty, the 
states equipped the Court with power to resort to the OAS Gen-
eral Assembly's political arena to enforce its judgments.251 In 
order to encourage use of the Court's contentious jurisdiction, 
states must respect the validity of the Court's judgments. 
The deterrent power of publicity as an enforcement mecha-
nism may be insufficient to engender governmental respect for 
the Court's judgments. A theoretical sanction cannot be consid-
ered an effective deterrent to domestic indolence.252 Since many 
countries enter into human rights treaties to facilitate trade by 
ameliorating negative public opinion of their countries, one 
would assume that the states' fear of exposing their human rights 
violations would be an adequate deterrent. 253 Yet, reliance on 
state representatives in the OAS General Assembly to criticize the 
violator may be misplaced.254 Even with the force of the Court's 
declaration of illegality, one state may have little incentive to 
disapprove of another state's domestic human rights policy, es-
pecially if one is economically dependent upon that state or 
equally culpable.255 The fact that the onlookers are not "materi-
ally" harmed by the human rights violations in another state 
intensifies the member states' traditional reluctance to inter-
vene.256 Furthermore, if a state decides to impose unilateral sanc-
tions in response to another state's human rights violations, the 
form of retaliation must be transmitted indirectly through trade 
or aid. 257 Because these alternatives are costly and do not bear a 
direct relationship to the extremity of the violation, they exacer-
bate regional indolence rather than encouraging activism.258 
The impotency of publicity as an enforcement mechanism for 
the Court's judgments may be due to the economic, political, and 
social characteristics of American states.259 Evidenced by the Eu-
250 N. SINGH, supra note 110, at 52. 
25J American Convention, supra note 4, at art. 65. 
252 N. SINGH, supra note 110, at 52. 
253 P. SIEGHART, supra note 17, at 93. 
254 Farer, The OAS at the Crossroads: Human Rights, 72 IOWA L.R. 401, 401-03 (1987); 
see Donnelly, International Human Rights Regimes, 40 #3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
599,617 (1986). 
255 M. QUIROGA, supra note 14, at 173-74; P. SIEGHART, supra note 17, at 93-95; Voglio, 
supra note 34, at 74. 
256 Donnelly, supra note 254, at 619; see Cabranes, supra note 14. 
257 Donnelly, supra note 254, at 619; see Cabranes, supra note 14. 
258 Donnelly, supra note 254, at 619; see Cabranes, supra note 14. 
259 Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1176-77. 
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ropean Human Rights system, publicity as a plausible sanction or 
deterrent to human rights violations can be effective in a regional 
system based on the profound interdependence of the consenting 
states.260 Within the framework of an economic and political com-
munity, member states would be more inclined to voluntarily 
consent to the reciprocal benefits the American Convention of-
fers. 261 Within such a community, the harmonization of domestic 
laws can reduce the likelihood of an external imposition of for-
eign human rights norms upon a protectionist government.262 
Mutual governmental concern for citizens working and living in 
other states is fostered by the free movement of workers in a 
community of states.263 Thus, the "material interdependence" 
within an economic community heightens the states' sense of 
"moral interdependence."264 In this environment, the enforce-
ment machinery of publicity has and can operate as an effective 
deterrent to human rights violations generating respect for the 
human rights system and invocation of its organs when necessary. 
For the American region, economic and political interdepend-
ence does not portend to become a reality in the foreseeable 
future. Considering the lingering commitment to noninterven-
tion, publicity as a sanction may not be a reliable deterrent or 
enforcement device. 265 Yet, the Court's immediate role in creating 
and applying human rights norms may guide state policy coor-
dination and cooperation with the Inter-American system.266 
Without increasing state cooperation, the Inter-American system 
may achieve only a limited acceptance of the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction and a discretionary, inadequate dialogue between 
governments and American Convention organs. 267 At present, 
260 Donnelly, supra note 254, at 620-24; see BuergenthaI, supra note 31, at 161. All 
twenty-one members of the Council of Europe have accepted the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Amnesty International, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1987, Work 
with Organizations, at 19. 
261 Donnelly, supra note 254, at 623. 
262 [d.; see EEC Treaty, supra note 197, pt. I, at arts. 3(h), 8(a). 
263 EEC Treaty, supra note 197, at pt. 2, tit. III, ch. I. 
264 Donnelly, supra note 254, at 623. 
265 Farer, supra note 254, at 401-03. 
266 Note, supra note 65, at 243; see Donnelly, supra note 254, at 616-17. 
267 See Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 163-64; the Velasquez Rodriguez case, INTER-
AM. CT.H.R., July 29, 1988 (merits), at para. 134. If, however, the Inter-American system 
ultimately attains merely a semblance of "inter-governmental co-operation, the parochial and 
perhaps even selfish at~itudes of which it would also be the expression, would by no 
means justify the danger of such a serious blow to universalism." K. V ASAK, supra note 
24, at 455 (Introduction). 
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human rights remain domestic issues in American states and 
depend primarily upon the public's insistence that human rights 
be given domestic legal recognition.268 To achieve permanent 
protection of those rights, the ability of the citizen to participate 
in a democratic process is considered to be essential. 269 In the 
future, increased state cooperation with the Inter-American sys-
tem could nurture a firm regional commitment to the protection 
of human rights. 270 
Although it cannot solve the abhorrent human rights situations 
in many American states, use of the Court's contentious jurisdic-
tion can encourage domestic legal recognition and protection of 
human rights. Perhaps with time, effective use of its contentious 
jurisdiction will satiate much of the current need for an Inter-
American Court. For the present, however, the problems con-
fronting its increased use must be addressed. As Judge Buergen-
thaI urged in 1986: 
The opportunity is now, with so many democratic govern-
ments represented at this table. Let us grasp this opportunity, 
if only to make this a better world for our children and for 
their children. We have so little to lose by giving it a try, and 
so much to gain if we succeed.271 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The future legal recognition of human rights in the American 
region may depend upon the strength of the Inter-American 
Court's contentious jurisdiction. Because human rights violations 
in many American states cannot be remedied via domestic tri-
bunals, the American Convention created the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction to ensure the protection of human rights in the Amer-
ican region. Since its establishment in 1979, however, the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction has heard only two cases. Whether find-
ing against the Honduran government in the Velasquez Rodriguez 
case will encourage other governments to subject themselves to 
the Court's scrutiny remains to be seen. As evidenced by the 
268 Thomas & Thomas, supra note 15, at 376; see Donnelly, supra note 254, at 616. 
269 M. CRAHAN, supra note 1, at 41. 
270 At this point in time, "If one can fairly say that the European Convention on Human 
Rights embodies the political faith of the people of Western Europe, one must also 
acknowledge that it embodies only the wistful longings of the peoples of Latin America." 
Cabranes, supra note 14, at 1177. 
271 Buergenthal, supra note 14, at 164. 
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Velasquez Rodriguez case, there are real drawbacks to invoking the 
Inter-American system which can preclude or dissuade petition-
ers from invoking the Court's contentious jurisdiction. The Ve-
lasquez Rodriguez decision, however, serves to strengthen the 
Court's authority in the perception of states parties which invig-
orates the Inter-American system. 
In the delicate area of human rights violations, an expedient 
judicial process is essential. Increased use of the Court's conten-
tious jurisdiction depends upon eliminating the obstacles to at-
taining a Court judgment. General remedial action such as re-
minding states to accept this jurisdiction, riding circuit, and taking 
liberal provisional measures may be necessary. Specific efforts to 
extend the time limit for petitions combined with educating the 
public about the Inter-American Court would encourage human 
rights victims to avail themselves of the Court's protection. Allo-
cating power to the Court to evaluate requests for extensions and 
a concrete referral provision could expedite the procedure. The 
contribution the Inter-American Court can make to the lives of 
Americans has yet to be fully realized. The human rights enum-
erated in the American Convention should not remain merely 
ideals of a troubled region. Citizens must demand domestic legal 
guarantees. The Inter-American Court's contentious jurisdiction 
is waiting to reinforce their efforts in the search for solutions. 
Amy S. Dwyer 
